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ABSTRACT
The U.S. real estate markets have undergone substantial fluctuations in recent
years. This dissertation attempts to understand the effects of some market fundamen-
tals on residential real estate market outcomes and efficiency from both theoretical
perspective and empirical evidence. This research contains three research projects.
First, a number of papers have identified the positive return of market size on
matching outcomes when the market exhibits frictions. In the second chapter, I
develop a novel directed search model that connects home list price, reservation
price with the sale outcomes and empirically test the thick market effects on trading
efficiency in housing market using home transaction data in Dallas metropolitan area
during 2006 to 2008. The results present strong and robust market size effects that
houses on thicker market are listed and sold at higher prices and significantly faster
speed.
The third chapter studies principal-agent problems in real estate markets, where
the brokerage service is often used to facilitate home sales. The seller agent gets
percentage commissions from the home owner and splits with the buyer agent in
reward for producing the buyer. A seller agent sometimes serves as dual agent that
represents both the seller and buyer sides and gets all commissions. I introduce a
theoretical model and present evidence from Dallas metropolitan housing market
that the agency structure may create principal-agent problems. I find that the dual-
agent-assisted home sales on average give 2.6% more discount on final price than
home sales that are assisted by two agents. Competition among home buyers may
reduce the severity of principal-agent problems.
The fourth chapter deviates from the rational agent assumption and investigates
ii
the behavioral impacts of price endings on home sales. Recent literature in behavioral
economics suggests that price endings have some psychological impacts on buyer’s
purchasing decision. In real estate markets, both round price and precise price (or
nine ending price) strategies are used in home sales. From the panel data and
regression discontinuity analysis of Dallas housing market transactions, I find homes
listed with precise price are on average sold at 4.6% higher price than homes listed
at round price only when prices are less than their nearby round prices, favoring the
nine ending price literature.
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE EFFICIENCY OF REAL ESTATE MARKETS
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. real estate markets have undergone substantial fluctuations over the
past decades and especially in the recent years. Scholars have long attempted to
understand and explain these dynamics and the difference across markets. This
research work aims to investigate the micro level economic model and studies how
market fundamentals affect residential real estate market outcomes and efficiency. I
provide some theoretical and empirical evidences from analyzing home transactions
in three aspects that may partially explain the variations of the outcomes in real
estate markets. This dissertation can be separated into three chapters and each
chapter is self-contained.
In the second chapter, I develop a directed search model and empirically tests the
thick market effects on trading efficiency in housing market using home transaction
data. Theoretical papers in search and matching literature suggest a positive return
of market size on matching quality when the market exhibits frictions. The real estate
market is a typical frictional market in which buyers and sellers actively search and
match for trading partners. A number of previous papers have identified the positive
effects of market size on matching quality from macro level analysis. But there
is still lack of micro level evidence. In this chapter, I first build a novel directed
search model that enables me to connect house list price, sale price and sale speed
and control for unobserved seller’s reservation price. This model is also consistent
with the fact that house buyers often bid for houses and the resulting sale prices
are higher than list prices. I then estimate the effects of market size on house list
price, sale price and sale speed in Dallas housing market between 2006 and 2008
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using the structural model. The size of the market is measured by defining a metric
space of house characteristics and aggregating number of houses weighted by the
distance measure. The estimation results show significant market size effects. I find
that houses on thicker market are listed and sold at higher price. On average, one
standard deviation increase in market size leads to about 7400 dollars increase in
list price and 8000 dollars increase in sale price, or 4.3% and 5% respectively. The
sale price to list price ratio also increases by 2%. In the meantime, when market
size grows by one standard deviation, the sale time reduces by 1.6 weeks or 11 days,
reflecting a faster matching between buyers and sellers.
The third chapter of this research adds real estate agents into the analysis and
studies principal-agent problems in real estate markets. In fact, real estate agents are
frequently involved in home transactions in residential real estate markets. According
to National Association of Realtors (NAR), the real estate agent-assisted home sales
account for 91% of total home sales in 2013. In a multi-year study of the residential
real estate brokerage industry, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) suggests that
”the market for real estate brokerage service does not accord with the customary
model of competitively functioning markets”, indicating that the brokerage service
may suffer from inefficiency. In the second chapter, I investigate the principal-agent
problems arisen from dual agency. For a typical home sale, a seller real estate agent
gets percentage commissions from the home owner and splits with the buyer agent
in reward for producing the home buyer. Dual agency happens when the seller
agent is directly contacted by a home buyer and in this situation, the agent gets all
commissions. This dual agency provides incentive for the seller’s agent to push the
seller to accept offers from direct buyers rather than from buyers who have buyer
agent, even if the offers are lower. In this chapter, I will introduce a theoretic model
and present empirical evidence from Dallas metropolitan housing market on this
2
principal-agent problem.
The fourth chapter of the dissertation deviates from the rational agent assumption
and investigates the behavioral impacts of price endings on home sales. Recent
literature in behavioral economics and marketing science suggests that price endings
may have some psychological impacts on buyer’s purchasing decision. In real estate
markets, some home sellers list the home at some round prices (i.e, $200,000) while
some sellers tend to use precise price strategy or general nine ending price strategy
(i.e. $199,910). From the panel data model and regression discontinuity analysis of
Dallas housing market transactions, I find homes listed with nine ending strategy
are on average sold at 4.6% higher price than homes listed at round price, consistent
with literature findings in retail markets. But precise prices do not always help the
sale. When homes are listed at some precise prices exceeding nearby round prices,
I do not find any behavioral influence buyer’s negotiation and purchasing and final
sale prices.
3
2. A DIRECTED SEARCH MODEL AND MARKET SIZE EFFECTS IN REAL
ESTATE MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
How does market size affect house seller’s strategic behaviors and how does it
affect real estate market outcomes? The thick market effects have been investigated
in numbers of theoretical and empirical work on some frictional markets. Early
papers focus on theoretical modeling the thick market effects in labor market by
introducing increasing return to scale matching technology in a search and matching
framework, i.e. see Diamond [4], Pissarides [23], Mortensen [22] and their early
research work. The market thickness is showed to encourage workers’ and firms’
search intensity and therefore reduce unemployment and vacancy spells and improve
matching efficiency. On the empirical side, a few papers also attempt to discover
some evidences of market size effects. For example, Gavazza [8] finds the existence
of thick market effects in real assets market by developing a search and matching
model for airplane traders. He finds that market size positively affects trading speed
and airplane utilization rate. Gan and Zhang [6] investigate the thick market effects
in labor market and find it reduces unemployment fluctuations over time. Gan and
Li [5] developed and applied matching model to the U.S. academic market for new
PhD economists and find that a field of specialization with more job openings and
more candidates has a higher probability of matching.
In this chapter, I study the thick market effects on house seller’s strategic pricing
and search behavior and on trading efficiency. I first introduce the house sale game
that that captures the institutional arrangements and conventions in U.S. housing
market and build an equilibrium directed search model. In the model, house sell-
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ers post asking prices of houses and attract house visitors. In each selling period,
randomly matched house buyers respond to the list price and compete for the house
by making strategic counteroffers (bids) according to their valuations of the house.
To be more specific, house visitors first decide whether to accept the list price. If
multiple visiting buyers accept the list price, they bid for the property. If no buyers
accept the offer, they may also bid for the house. The bidding rule is assumed to
follow first-price sealed bid auction. The property therefore is entitled to the win-
ning buyer with final transaction price either less, equal or more than the list price.
The equilibrium condition shows that under the existence of competition and bid-
ding among buyers, the list price serves to segment the high valuation buyers from
low valuation buyers. The market size effect enters in my model through affecting
the matching rate or offer arrival rate to the seller. Numerical simulations suggest
that house sellers benefit from thick market effects by setting a higher list price to
segment buyers and expected higher sale price and shorter time to sale. In addition,
houses in thicker market are more likely to sell at or above list price even if they are
listed at higher prices. And the ratio of expected sale price to list price also increase
as market size increases. I then test the theoretic implications using a unique house
transaction data set from Dallas Multiple Listing Service. I find empirical evidence
of the prevalence of thick market effects. Specifically speaking, one standard devia-
tion increase in market size or nine more listing houses in the sub-market leads to
about 0.2% increase in sale price to list price ratio on average, equivalent to more
than 4000 dollars increase in sale price. The probability to sell above list price also
increases by 0.6%. In addition, one standard deviation increase of market size also
shortens the marketing time by 1.6 weeks or 11 days.
This research makes several contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the
search literature by studying strategic bidding among house buyers and the role of
5
list price in segmenting buyers with heterogeneous valuations. Some early papers
that attempt to study the effects of list price on house sale outcomes either fail to
explain its role or lead to implications inconsistent with real house transaction re-
sults. For example, Horowitz [12] assumes a reduced form distribution of buyer’s
offer conditional on list price but he does not explain why and how offers are affected
by list price. Knight [16] and Haurin et al. [10] posit that the list price truncates
the buyer’s counteroffer. But this assumption violates the fact that a substantial
amount of houses are sold above list price. In this research instead, I explicitly in-
troduce interactions between sellers and buyers in the house sale game and allow
for potential competition among realized buyers. Therefore buyer’s bidding behav-
iors are naturally introduced in the directed search model and the role of list price
becomes clear under equilibrium. It also explains why sometimes the sale price is
higher than house list price. Similar to our game specification, Albrecht et al. [1]
also develop a directed search model in housing market that allows for bidding, but
they introduce bidding rule to be ascending auction instead of first-price sealed bid
auction so that pricing does not affect seller’s revenue. They instead regard the
role of list price as signal of seller’s heterogeneous type. Second, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first project that studies how market size affect seller’s pricing
strategy in directed search model framework. Prior to my study, Gan and Zhang [7]
study the impact of the unemployment rate on the housing market in the presence of
the thick market effect. They calibrate a matching model using Texas city-level data
and find that an increase in the unemployment generates poorer matching quality
and as a consequence, prices and the transaction volume both decline more than in
the absence of the thick market effect. this research connects market size with house
list price, sale price, price reduction and selling speed and empirically investigate the
thick market effects using micro level transaction data.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I
introduce the house sale game and seller’s directed search model that captures the
institutional arrangements in housing market and derive equilibrium conditions as
well as some market outcomes. Since the system does not admit analytical expression,
in section 3 I numerically solve the model and study the effect of market size on
market outcomes. In section 4, I introduce the Dallas Multiple Listing Service (MLS)
data set that are used for empirical analysis and discuss the constructions of some
key variables. In section 5, I estimate the reduced form model and structural model.
The last section concludes the paper.
2.2 The Directed Search Model
2.2.1 The House Sale Game and Equilibrium
The house sale game plays in the following steps.
Stage 1: A seller sets a list price a of the house.
Stage 2: In each selling period, a buyer can visit exact one house in each sub-
market and generate valuation x of the house independently. The matching process
is random. Valuations are private information to the buyers. After the visit, each
buyer decides whether to accept the list price a or not and the seller gets to know
whether buyer’s valuation is no less than a or below a.
Stage 3: There are three situations. If only one buyer accepts the list price a,
the house is transferred to that buyer. If two or more buyers accept the list price in a
selling period, they compete for the house by making counteroffers. The environment
resembles first-price sealed bid auction. If none of visiting buyers accept the list price,
buyers may also make counteroffers.
Stage 4: The seller can either accept the best counteroffer or deny all counterof-
fers. In the latter case, the sale goes on to the next period. In addition, if the house
7
attracts no visitors in a period, the seller retains the house for the next period.
In this game, it is important to clarify the information availability to sellers and
buyers. First, I assume that house characteristics are not fully observed by buyers
before visit. Without visiting and valuating the house, buyers can not compare two
houses with different list price. Instead, they are often focusing on some sub-markets
for houses in their preferred location range and price range (say houses with value
between 150,000 dollars to 200,000 dollars in some subdivision). The before-visiting
incomplete information assumption suggests that buyer’s visit to houses in one sub-
market is random and the offer arrival rate to a single house would not be affected by
list price. Second, I do not consider brokerage service in the housing market. Some
papers find the existence of principal-agency problem and attempt to model it. For
example, Hsieh and Moretti [13] find that real estate agents sell their own houses
faster than their clints’ houses. Yavas and Yang [32] instead modeled the agent’s
work effort into seller’s pricing model. In our paper, since I focus on the directed
search and market size, we do not include real estate agents in the model.
There are a few advantages of specifying the game rule explicitly in our analysis.
First, the procedures of house sale game generally reflect the institutional arrange-
ments and conventions in U.S. housing market. Second, it provides a structural
approach to study the role of list price. The buyer’s offer distribution conditional on
list price can be derived from equilibrium conditions. In comparison to Horowitz [12]
and Haurin et al. [10], the role of list price on buyer’s counteroffer strategy tractable
in our model. Second, since the game plays in discrete time version, it naturally
allows for multiple visiting buyers and therefore introduced potential competitions
among those buyers. Bidding among buyers automatically solves the Rothchild’s
paradox that the equilibrium offer distribution is non-degenerated. In addition, the
determination of final price is consistent with actual house transaction data that
8
houses may be sold less, equal or more than list price.
To derive the equilibrium conditions, I first study the buyer’s optimal counterof-
fer strategy (or response function) to seller’s list price a. We assume that buyer’s
valuation of the house after visit is generated independently from distribution with
cdf F (x) and pdf f(x). If there are multiple visiting buyers, we denote G(k−1)(x) and
g(k−1)(x) the cdf and pdf of the highest value among k − 1 buyers. For buyer with
valuation x less than list price, the symmetric equilibrium counteroffer (bidding)
strategy β(x) and expected payment m(x)x≥a given k competing buyers are1
β(x) = a
G(k−1)(a)
G(k−1)(x)
+
1
G(k−1)(x)
∫ x
a
yg(k−1)(y)dy; (2.1)
and
m(x)x≥a = aG(k−1)(a) +
∫ x
a
yg(k−1)(y)dy. (2.2)
For buyers with valuation x equal to or greater than list price, the counteroffer
strategy and expected payment m(x)x<a are
β(x) = b
G(k−1)(b)
G(k−1)(b)
+
1
G(k−1)(x)
∫ x
b
yg(k−1)(y)dy; (2.3)
and
m(x)x<a = bG
(k−1)(b) +
∫ x
b
yg(k−1)(y)dy. (2.4)
Summing up these two parts, the ex ante expected revenue to the seller given number
1See Krishna [17] for derivation details.
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of bidders k is
E(pik) =k{
∫ ω
a
[aG(k−1)(a) +
∫ x
a
yg(k−1)(y)dy]f(x)dx
+
∫ a
b
[bG(k−1)(b) +
∫ x
b
yg(k−1)(y)dy]f(x)dx}
=kaG(k−1)(a)[1− F (a)] + k
∫ ω
a
y(1− F (y))g(k−1)(y)dy
+ kbG(k−1)(b)[F (a)− F (b)] + k
∫ a
b
y(1− F (y))g(k−1)(y)dy
=kaG(k−1)(a)[1− F (a)] + kbG(k−1)(b)[F (a)− F (b)]
+ k
∫ ω
b
y(1− F (y))g(k−1)(y)dy.
(2.5)
After deriving the buyer’s counteroffer strategy given house list price a and fixed
number of buyers, I now study the seller’s search strategy. Since the number of
visiting buyers k that a house seller encounters in a selling period is random at a
given sub-market, we assume it follows Poisson distribution with arrival rate λ, i.e,
the probability that k buyers visit the house in a single period is
pk = Pr(n = k, λ) =
λke−λ
k!
. (2.6)
The arrival rate λ as we discussed, does not depend on variables other than the
sub-market conditions. The seller’s dynamic problem is therefore to set optimal list
price and reservation price {a, b} that maximize the following value function
V (a, b) = max
(a,b)
{−c+β{
∞∑
k=0
pkF (b)
kV +
∞∑
k=1
pkkaG
(k−1)(a)[1− F (a)]
+
∞∑
k=1
pkkbG
(k−1)(b)[F (a)− F (b)]
+
∞∑
k=1
pkk
∫ ω
b
y(1− F (y))g(k−1)(y)dy}}.
(2.7)
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After some algebra, the Bellman equation (2.7) can be expressed as
(b+ c)β−1 = be−λeλF (b) + λae−λeλF (a)[1− F (a)]
+ λbe−λeλF (b)[F (a)− F (b)] + λ2e−λ
∫ ω
b
y[(1− F (y)]eλF (y)f(y)dy.
(2.8)
The first order condition of the Bellman equation with respect to a gives us the
optimal list price
bf(a) + {λaf(a)[1− F (a)] + 1− F (a)− af(a)} eλ[F (a)−F (b)] = 0. (2.9)
The optimal list price and reservation price {a, b} are jointly determined by opti-
mality conditions (2.8) and (2.9). It is readily to see that seller’s optimal list price
and reservation price depend on parameters including seller’s waiting or search cost,
offer arrival rate λ and the distribution of buyer’s valuation F .
Let q =
∑∞
k=0 Pr(n = k)F (b)
k denote the probability that the house is not sold in
one period, we can also investigate how expected time to sale and the expected sale
price are affected by these factors. For example, the expected sale price conditional
on a sale can be expressed as
E(p|p > b) = 1
1− q{
∞∑
k=1
pkkaG
(k−1)(a)[1− F (a)] +
∞∑
k=1
pkkbG
(k−1)(b)[F (a)− F (b)]
+
∞∑
k=1
pkk
∫ ω
b
y(1− F (y))g(k−1)(y)dy}
=
(b+ c)β−1 − be−λ(1−F (b))
1− e−λ(1−F (b)) .
(2.10)
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And the expected time to sale is
E(TOM) =
∞∑
t=1
tqt−1(1− q) = 1
1− q =
1
1− e−λ(1−F (b)) . (2.11)
2.2.2 Simulated Solution and Model Implications
From the optimality conditions we know that house list price and reservation price
are jointly determined and market outcomes are affected by market size that affects
offer arrival rate, seller’s waiting or search cost and distribution of buyer’s valuation.
To better illustrate how these variables affects seller’s list price, reservation price and
market outcomes including final sale price and selling speed, we numerically solve
the model. We first assume that the buyer’s valuation x is uniformly distributed on
[µ−√3σ, µ+√3σ] with mean and variance are µ and σ2. The optimality conditions
can be simplified to
[µ+
√
3σ − b+ 4
√
3σ
λ
− λb(µ+
√
3σ − a)
2
√
3σ
] exp(−λ(µ+
√
3σ − b)
2
√
3σ
)
+
λa(µ+
√
3σ − a)
2
√
3σ
exp(−λ(µ+
√
3σ − a)
2
√
3σ
) + µ+
√
3σ − 4
√
3σ
λ
= β−1(b+ s)
(2.12)
and
b+
(
λa
µ+
√
3σ − a
2
√
3σ
+ µ+
√
3σ − 2a
)
exp
(
λ(a− b)
2
√
3σ
)
= 0. (2.13)
The solutions to above system of equations do not admit any closed form express
and therefore we find numerical solution using Matlab. Following convention, the
discount rate β is set at 0.997. The initial offer arrival rate λ is set at 0.5 and
initial search cost or waiting cost is assumed to be c = 800. The mean and standard
deviation of buyer’s valuation distribution are $150,000 and $50,000. We report
12
the simulated solution in the first line of table 2.1. The house list price, buyer’s
reservation price and final sale price are $219,300 ,$201,200 and $215,600 respectively.
Roughly 34% of the houses are sold at or above the list price and the expected
marketing time is 10.3 weeks or 72 days.
To understand how market size affects seller’s pricing behavior and market out-
comes, I simulate the effects by changing offer arrival rate parameter. The results
are reported in the second panel of table 2.1. Holding the distribution of buyer’s
valuation unchanged, we increase the arrival rate from 0.1 to 0.7, the house list price
increases from $192,600 to $222,900 and the expected sale price increases even more
(from $172,500 to $221,800). The percentage of houses sell at or above list price
sharply increases from 7% to 45% and the ratio of expected sale price to list price
increases from 0.895 to 0.995, indicating that houses in thicker market enjoy more
benefits from buyer’s bidding. In addition, the expected time to sale also decreased
sharply when offer arrival rate increases, even when the sellers strategically increase
their reservation price of the house.
Some other factors can also affect market outcomes, including seller’s search cost
or waiting cost and the distribution of buyer’s valuation. In the second panel of table
2.1, when seller’s search cost increases from 100 dollars per week to 1000 dollars per
week, seller tends to lower the list price and reservation price to sell the house faster,
and the expected sale price also decreased. The heterogeneity of buyer’s valuation
also affects house sale. For example, Haurin et al. [10] find empirical evidence from
Columbus, Ohio housing data set that houses that attract larger variance of buyer’s
valuation tends to have higher ratio of the list price to the expected sales and longer
marketing time. In the second panel of table 2.1, I also simulate the market outcomes
by increasing buyer’s standard deviation from 30,000 dollars through 80,000 dollars
and the ratio of expected sale price to list price and time to sale increase substantially.
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2.3 The Data
2.3.1 The Dallas Multiple Listing Service
The data set I use comes from Dallas multiple listing service(MLS) database.
The multiple listing service is an actively managed system that enables real estate
brokers share information on properties they have listed and invite other brokers
to cooperate in their sale in exchange for compensation if they produce the buyer.
The multiple listing service disseminates listing information and sellers benefit by
increased exposure to their property and buyers benefit because they can obtain
information about all MLS-listed properties while working with only one broker.2[31].
Current, about 90 percent of residential properties are listed and sold through over
800 MLSs nationwide.
The Dallas multiple listing service database focuses on the Dallas metropolitan
area and its vicinity and records the listing information and transaction details of
every residential property that is listed on Dallas MLS. A typical house listing record
in Dallas MLS contains information on the type of house, house address, list date,
off-market date, listing price, final sale price and a selection of house characteristics
including home size, lot size, number of bedrooms, number of bathroom, etc.. It also
includes some agents and broker information. We were able to get the MLS data
on property transactions between the third quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of
2008.
Several points about the data set are worth mention. First, my data set includes
only residential properties. I focus on residential single-family houses only and con-
dos and other types of properties are excluded from our analysis. Second, there is no
explicit geographic boarder that defines Dallas MLS market and our data set con-
2see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple listing service for detail functions of multiple listing
service.
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tains transactions in Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington metropolitan area and vicinities.
Instead, we have specific physical address for each house. Third, since our data set
records all realized transactions, houses that are listed before the sample period and
sold within such period are included. On the contrary, houses that are listed within
the sample period but not sold are not captured by the data set.
Besides the key variables, I also have information on house characteristics, in-
cluding number of bedrooms and number of bathrooms. The house square footage
is available for about one third of the houses. For the rest of the houses we use
regression-based method to impute approximate square footage.3 The size of hous-
ing lot is recorded either in square footage or side lengths for some houses. We
carefully identify the lot size and derive approximated lot size using imputation
method4. Furthermore, we also generate an indicator that captures irregular lot5.
The summary statistics of list price, sale price, time to sale and house characteristic
information are provided in table 2.2.
2.3.2 Measure of Market Size
The key variable in my analysis is the size of the market. The variable of main
interest is the the market size. The definition of a sub housing market, however, is not
trivial since there is neither a well-defined geographic boundary of sub housing market
nor an explicit set of house characteristics that segment sub-markets. In our paper,
we define a sub-market as houses in a subdivision within certain price range. The
measure of market size is also nontrivial. Even under the ideal measure of market size
3We first regress house square footage on number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, house lot
size (if available) and 5-digit zip code dummies. Then we use the estimated coefficients to predict
the square footage for missing values.
4The size of housing lot is recorded in side lengths for some houses. If the lot is in rectangular
shape, the lot size is directed calculated as the product of two adjacent sides. If the lot is non-
rectangle, the lot size cannot be exactly computed without at least one known angle. We therefore
approximate the lot size by taking average of two opposite sides and multiply the two averages.
5The irregular lot is defined as non-rectangular lot.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
List rice 214481 349253 191552
Sale price 201042 230265 191552
Price reduction -13439 249875 191552
Sale price to list price ratio 0.94 0.10 191513
Percentage of houses (=LP) 8.9% 0.285 191552
Percentage of houses (¿LP) 14.6% 0.353 191552
Time on market (Weeks) 12.03 11.87 191552
Market size 1 (subdiv, 30k price range) 8.9 17.9 190243
Market size 2 (subdiv, 50k price range) 12.6 26.1 190243
Market size 3 (subdiv, 100k price range) 18.1 37.9 190243
Market size 4 (subdiv only) 28.9 55.3 190243
Number of bedrooms 3.4 0.73 191442
Number of bathrooms 2.5 0.93 191331
House square footage 2217 1239 51409
Imputed House square footage 2228 967 189433
House lot size (sqft) 14081 112989 75727
Percentage of irregular lots 6.5% 0.25 75727
as total number of market participants, to identify who are the market participants is
not an easy question. In practice, economists adopt different measures of market size.
In ? ]’s paper, the market size is measured by city population. Gavazza [8] instead
measure the market size by airplane inventory. The former measure is suitable for
cross-city level data but may not be applicable to the Dallas area data. Therefore in
our paper, we measure the market size as number of house listing in the sub-market
during the whole sample period. For example, one sub-market may be defined as the
market of houses in subdivision ”Village of Woodland Spring” with price range from
200, 000 to 300, 000 dollars. To test the robustness of the market size effects. we also
vary the price bandwidths from 30,000 dollars, 50,000 dollars, 100,000 dollars to the
whole price range and generate a set of market size measures. The average market
sizes are 9, 13, 18 and 29 lists correspondingly. The standard deviations are 18,26,38
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and 55, reflection a substantial variation in market size.
2.4 Estimation and Empirical Results
The theoretic model suggests that house list price, final sale price and selling speed
are all jointly affected by offer arrival rate and distribution of buyer’s valuation. In
the mean time, it provides us three empirical implications on the thick market effects
in housing market. First, the percentage of houses sold at or above list price increase
as market size increases. Second, the ratio of sale price to list price also increases as
the market size increases. Third, houses in thicker market are sold faster. Next, we
first attempt to investigate these thick market effects using Dallas MLS data.
2.4.1 Market Size, List Price and Sale Price
As I discussed earlier, the theoretical model suggests that house sellers enjoy
benefits from thick market effects by setting a higher list price and expected higher
sale price. More interestingly, houses in thicker market are more likely to attract
bids and sold above list price even their list price is already higher. In our data set,
about 9% of the houses are sold at the list price and 15% are sold higher than list
price, reflecting substantial amount of bidding behaviors. The average sale price to
list price ratio is 0.94 and the sale price is about 6% less than the list price. The
standard deviation is 10%, equivalent to 21,000 dollars.
I first regress the sale price to list price ratio on market size and house character-
istics. Table 2.3 reports the estimated thick market effect on sale price to list price
ratio after controlling time fixed effect and location dummies.. As discussed in the
data section, we defines a sub housing market as houses in certain subdivision with
certain price range. In the first column, the price bandwidth that defines a market is
30,000 dollars and market size is computed as number of listed houses in subdivision
within such price bandwidths. The coefficient on market size is significantly posi-
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tive. The magnitude shows that one standard deviation increase in market size (or
equivalently nine more listing houses) of sub-market leads to about 0.2% increase in
sale price to list price ratio on average, equivalent to more than 4000 dollars increase
in final sale price. In column two through four of table 2.3, we gradually increase
the price bandwidths that used to define the sub-market. The result is robust to the
measures of market size.
Second, I estimate a probit model to test how market size affect the likelihood
that houses are sold above list price. The estimation results are presented in table
2.4. The market size are defined in the same way as that in table 3. From the
table we find that the coefficient on the market size in the probit model is 0.00147,
corresponds to 0.6% increase in the likelihood of selling high when increasing the
market size by one standard deviation.
2.4.2 Market Size and Selling Speed
Besides the effects on house list price and sale price, the market size also affect
the selling speed. The increase of market size has two impacts that may affect house
expected marketing time or selling speed. First, it increases the offer arrival rate and
reduces the expected time to sale. Second, it also reservation price actually prolongs
the house sale. The theoretic prediction that the former effect dominate the latter
so that in overall, houses are sold faster in thick market than in thin market even
when sellers strategically raise their reservation price.
To test this prediction, I again regress the time that houses stay on market
(TOM) on market size and house characteristics. Table 2.5 reports the estimation
results after controlling time fixed effect and location dummies. The effects are all
negatively under all four measures of market size and the and significant in the first
three columns. The result shows that on average, one standard deviation increase
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Table 2.3: Estimation of Thick Market Effect on Sale Price to List Price Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ratio ratio ratio ratio
Market size 1 0.013%***
(2.71E-05)
Market size 2 0.010%***
(1.79E-05)
Market size 3 0.002%*
(1.21E-05)
Market size 4 0.001%*
(6.29E-06)
Number of bedrm -0.00190*** -0.00192*** -0.00184** -0.00178**
(0.000736) (0.000736) (0.000736) (0.000732)
Number of bathrm -0.000914 -0.000892 -0.000921 -0.00091
(0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00111)
House lot size (sqft) -3.58E-09 -3.57E-09 -3.61E-09 -3.55E-09
(2.49E-09) (2.49E-09) (2.50E-09) (2.50E-09)
Irregular lot dummy 0.00323*** 0.00321*** 0.00320*** 0.00319***
(0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109)
House size (sqft) 4.43e-06*** 4.42e-06*** 4.27e-06*** 4.12e-06***
(1.20E-06) (1.20E-06) (1.19E-06) (1.19E-06)
Zipcode Year*Qtr Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.946*** 0.946***
(0.00212) (0.00212) (0.00211) (0.0021)
Observations 74,459 74,459 74,459 74,459
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 2.4: Probit Estimation of Thick Market Effect on Likelihood to Sell Above
List Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Probit Probit Probit Probit
Market size 1 0.00147***
(0.000468)
Market size 2 0.00114***
(0.000315)
Market size 3 0.000399*
(0.00021)
Market size 4 -1.80E-05
-0.000125)
Number of bedrm 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.106***
(0.0126) (0.0126) -0.0126) (0.0125)
Number of bathrm 0.0552*** 0.0556*** 0.0555*** 0.0546***
(0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0191)
House lot size (sqft) 2.30e-07*** 2.30e-07*** 2.30e-07*** 2.29e-07***
(4.95E-08) -4.95E-08) -4.96E-08) -4.98E-08)
Irregular lot dummy -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.164*** -0.164***
(0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0268) -0.0268)
House size (sqft) -0.000306*** -0.000306*** -0.000308*** -0.000308***
(2.40E-05) (2.40E-05) (2.40E-05) -2.40E-05)
Zipcode Year*Qtr Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.900*** -0.900*** -0.894*** -0.890***
(0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0334)
Observations 74,448 74,448 74,448 74,448
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 2.5: Estimation of Thick Market Effect on House Selling Speed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES TOM TOM TOM TOM
Market size 1 -0.00815***
(0.00312)
Market size 2 -0.00477**
(0.00207)
Market size 3 -0.00300**
(0.00137)
Market size 4 -0.000476
(0.000763)
Number of bedrm 0.151* 0.152* 0.151* 0.159**
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Number of bathrm 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.402*** 0.399***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)
House lot size (sqft) -2.06E-07 -2.07E-07 -2.05E-07 -2.06E-07
(3.04E-07) (3.04E-07) (3.04E-07) (3.04E-07)
Irregular lot dummy -0.549*** -0.550*** -0.550*** -0.551***
(0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155)
House size (sqft) 0.000523*** 0.000519*** 0.000514*** 0.000505***
(0.000146) (0.000146) (0.000146) (0.000146)
Zipcode Year*Qtr Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 8.167*** 8.180*** 8.190*** 8.215***
(0.213) (0.213) (0.213) (0.212)
Observations 73,730 73,730 73,730 73,730
R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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in market size may shorten the selling time by 1.6 weeks or 11 days. Comparing the
average marketing time of 80 days, market size improves selling speed and trading
efficiency substantially.
2.4.3 Structural Estimation
Since the house list price and the seller’s reservation price are jointly affected by
market size and offer arrival rate and all market outcomes are influenced simultane-
ously, estimating the thick market effects on the sale price and sale speed separately
may fail to control for unobservables and suffer from endogeneity issues. In this sec-
tion, I specify a structural model that naturally derived from the theoretical directed
search model to estimate the effects of market size.
There are two main issues needed to be address in the structural estimation.
First, similar to Horowitz [12] and labor market data, I only observe the buyer’s
counteroffers (final transaction prices) that are accepted by sellers and do not ob-
serve rejected prices. In another words, I do not observe buyers’ counteroffers that
are less than seller’s reservation price. And the seller’s reservation price is the not
directly observed either. Therefore the reservation price as truncation point of the
buyer’s counteroffers needs to be estimated in the structural model. Second, the the-
oretical model assumes homes are identical and ignores the heterogeneity in home
characteristics. In empirical structural analysis, I need to introduce house character-
istics into the econometric model. Specifically, I assume that
yi = Xiβ + εi; (2.14)
where yi is the house final sale price and Xi is a vector of house characteristics.
εi reflects the heterogeneity in buyer’s valuation of the house. Noticing that since
the observed sale price are truncated at seller’s reservation price, I can specify the
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log-likelihood function as follow
LL =
N∑
i=1
− λ(TOMi − 1)[1− F (bi|ai; θ)]
− 1[yi = ai]× λ[1− F (yi|X; θ)]log[λ[1− F (yi|X; θ)]]
− 1[yi 6= ai]× [λ[1− F (yi|X; θ)]log[λ2(1− F (yi|X; θ))f(yi|X; θ)]];
(2.15)
where ai, bi and TOMi refer to observed house list price, reservation price and weeks
on the market respectively. θ is a set of parameters. I further assume that the market
size Mi enters into the model by affecting the market arrival rate, i.e., λ = γMi.
The heterogeneity of buyer’s valuation on each house εi follows normal distribution
N(0, σ2), so that F (yi|X; θ) = Φ((yi−Xiβ)/σ) and f(yi|X) = (1/σ)φ((yi−Xiβ)/σ).
As I discussed earlier, the seller’s reservation price is not observed and therefore I
consider it as a parameter to be estimated. From the first order conditions in previous
section, I find that the reservation price bi and list price ai are jointly determined.
Therefore the availability of list price information could also help the identification
of reservation price. Specifically, I follow the literature to assume that bi = γai
and substitute this relation into the likelihood function and the parameters γ in the
function (and so forth the reservation price) can be estimated together with the rest
parameters in the model. The structural estimation results are reported in table 2.6
and the standard deviations are derived from bootstrapping.
From table 2.6, I find that the market size positively affect the sale price and
sale speed, consistent with the reduced form results. It suggests that homes on the
largest 5% market enjoy a market size premium of about 5000 dollars than homes
on the smallest 5% market and are sold at about 12 days faster on average. These
micro level findings together with macro level findings in previous literature show
that both the matching quality and matching speed are positively affected by the
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Table 2.6: Structural Estimation of Thick Market Effects
(1) (2)
VARIABLES SP/LP TOM
Market size 1 (subdiv, 30k) 0.0158%*** -0.0202***
(3.41E-04) (0.00237)
Home characteristics Yes Yes
Zipcode and Year*Qtr Dummies Yes Yes
Constant 0.928*** 8.767***
(0.00212) (0.413)
Observations 73,730 73,730
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
market size.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a house sale game that that captures the institutional
arrangements and conventions in U.S. housing market and build an equilibrium di-
rected search model to study the thick market effects on house seller’s strategic
pricing and search behavior and trading efficiency. The bidding occurs when multi-
ple buyers compete for property and buyer’s strategic counteroffers are affected by
seller’s choice of house list price. In equilibrium, it allows sellers to adopt list price
to segment buyers by their valuations. And the final sale price, consistent with fact
of the real transaction data, could be either lower, equal or higher than list price
depending on realized number of buyers and their valuations in a selling period.
By numerically simulating the equilibrium directed search model, I find thick
market effects prevail in housing market. First, house sellers benefit from thick
market effects by setting a higher list price and expected higher sale price and shorter
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time to sale. Second, houses in thicker market are also more likely to sell at or above
list price even if they are listed at higher prices. And the ratio of expected sale price
to list price also increase as market size increases.
I then empirically investigate the thick market effects in housing market using
unique data set from Dallas Multiple Listing Service. In reduced form analysis, I find
that one standard deviation increase in market size increase sale price to list price
ratio by 0.2% on average, which is equivalent to more than 4000 dollars increase
in sale price. And the probability to sell above list price also increases by 0.6%.
After controlling the unobservable effects, the results from structural model are also
consistent with the reduced form findings. In the meantime, I find that while the thick
market effects raise seller’s reservation price and increases offer rejection probability,
one standard deviation increase in market size still shortens the marketing time by
1.6 weeks or 11 days. These micro level findings together suggest that the existence
of thick market effects in real estate markets.
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3. DUAL AGENCY AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS IN REAL
ESTATE MARKETS
3.1 Introduction
In housing market, real estate agents are usually hired to facilitate home sales.
According to National Association of Realtors (NAR), the real estate agent-assisted
home sales account for 91% of total home sales in 2013.1 Real estate agents usually
have superior network in home sales, more knowledge on the real estate market,
better marketing strategy and superior negotiation skills than typical home owners.
When representing home owners, the agents are delegated exclusive authority to list
the homes on the multiple listing service, a home listing platform and invite other
agents to cooperate in their sales. The seller agents also provide a bundle of brokerage
services including determining appropriate listing price, advertising and marketing
and property maintenance. In addition, they also assist with legal documentation
of home sales. In most cases, the seller agents are paid a fraction of final sale price
from the sellers as commissions.
Not only home owners hire real estate agents to assist the home sales, the home
buyers also frequently consult agents in their home searching process. Sometimes
the real estate agents will serve as the buyer agents and help them on home eval-
uation and price negotiation. The buyer agents are not paid by buyers for their
assistance, but split the commissions with the seller agents as reward for producing
the matchings between home sellers and home buyers. In some other circumstances,
if the agents recommend their own listings to the buyers or if the buyers contact
1Agent-assisted home sales accounts for 91% and FSBOs accounts for 9% of total home sales.
The typical FSBO home sold for $184, 000 compared to $230, 000 for agent-assisted home sales. See
more details at http://www.realtor.org/field-guides/field-guide-to-quick-real-estate-statistics.
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them directly for their listings, they play role as dual agency that represents both
the sellers and the buyers. And in this scenario, the agents get all commissions.
In US, the conventional commission rate is 6 percent of the final sale price. In
recent years, the competition among real estate agents has driven the average com-
mission rate down to 5.1%.2. From the seller agent’s point of view, the commissions
from home sales could differ substantially depending on whether they serve as dual
agent or they sold with help of other buyer agents. The difference in commissions
resulting from two types of agency structures provide the seller agents a strong in-
centive to sell the home to direct buyers than to buyers that are assisted by buyer
agents, even at lower prices.
The principal-agent problem may arise in two folds. First, the information asym-
metry between the home owners and the seller agents allows the seller agents to
persuade the owners to accept lower offers from direct buyers and they enjoy higher
commissions with the sacrifice of the owners’ interest. Second, as a consequence and
from the home buyer’s point of view, the home buyers may not benefit from the
assistance of buyer agents. Although the buyer agents do not necessarily collude
with the seller agents, they do not bring any extra discount to the buyer. Instead,
by bringing in more agent in the sale, the home buyers are paying more on the sale
price.
In this chapter, I empirically test the effects of agency structure on home sales,
including home sale price and speed of sale. To illustrate the idea, I first build a
simple search model to show that the agency structure could create principal-agent
problems through affecting the commission structure. In each period, the seller
2In some large cities such as Los Angeles and New York City, the real estate commission rate
is further dropped to 4.5% to 5% for some listings. In most circumstances, the agents split the
commission when two agents are involved in the transaction. In some other cases, the buyer’s agents
are often guaranteed to get 2.5% to 3% commission rate when they produce the buyer
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agent will set two reservation prices contingent on the buyer type, a direct buyer or
a buyer who has a buyer agent. An commission maximized seller agent will set a
lower reservation price for direct buyers and higher reservation price for buyers with
agent, and enjoy more commissions when the home is sold to a direct buyer than to
buyer with agent. The testable implication is that the average sale price of home
sales in the dual agency case will be lower than the price of home sales that involve
two different agents. In addition, although the agency structure distorts the seller
agent’s incentive on sale price, it has null effect on sale speed, since at each period,
the agency structure in the next period is not deterministic but random.
The data set I use for empirical study is from Dallas multiple listing service
database in 2007. The data set offers several advantages in studying the agency
structure and home sales. First, I have the information on the ID’s of the real estate
agents that are involved in each home sale. The agent’s ID is unique for each agent
and it helps me to separate the 16% of the home sales that are assisted by only seller’s
agent from the rest 84% home sales that are assisted by two agents. Moreover, the
brokerage office IDs are also recorded in each sale and I can test if there is any
collusion between agents. Second, the home listing information and sale outcomes
including home list price, sale price, list date and off-market date are all available. I
am able to construct the sale discount and speed of sale from these variables. Third,
each home listing also contains the information on house characteristics including
home size, location, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, etc.. I am able to
test if there is any connection between the agency structure and home characteristics.
I can also control for these variables in the analysis.
My identification strategy is to compare the outcomes of home sales in the dual
agency situation with that of home sales that involve two different agents. If the
principal-agent problem exists, I would expect the dual-agent-assisted home sales
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have lower sale price or deeper discounts than do the two-agent-assisted home sales.
The identification strategy relies on two assumptions. First, there is no sorting on
home characteristics. If homes with lower quality attract more direct buyers than
other homes do, the difference in sale price may be explained by the difference in home
value rather than agency structure. I test the validity of this assumption and find no
correlation between agency structure and home observed characteristics. Second, the
agency structure is not predictable and it is a stochastic consequence. If the agency
structure is predictable at the time of home listing, the agents may strategically
set the home list price. The relation between sale price and agency structure may
be attributed to the relation between list price and sale price. I also do not find
any evidence connects the list price with the agency structure. In addition, the
agent’s ability also matters in home sales. If some agents are more knowledgable
and more famous, they may generate more home sales without cooperation of other
agents. Failing in capturing the agent heterogeneity could result in a spurious relation
between agency structure and sale price. In my regressions, I control the unobserved
agent level information through the agent fixed effects. If all these assumptions hold,
the assignment of the agency structure is as good as random conditional on the agent
fixed effects.
Overall, the empirical study supports the existence of the principal-agent problem
on the home sale price that is caused by the agency structure. After controlling the
agent fixed effects, I find the home sales in the dual agency scenario have 1.7% to
2.6% or equivalently 3,400 to 5,000 dollars deeper discount on the sale price than
that of the home sales which involve two different agents, adding to the average
discounts of 6%. In addition, the seller agent’s ability to push the home owners for
more discounts also depends on the competition among buyers. Focusing on the
home sales which attract fewer buyers by excluding home sales of which the sale
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price is higher than the list price incurred by bidding among multiple buyers, I find
that the discounts are even deeper in the dual agency sales. Also, consistent with
the theoretical prediction, I do not find any correlation between the time on the
market and agency structure after controlling the agent fixed effects. These results
are robust to different model specifications.
Another plausible explanation to the difference in the sale price between dual-
agent-assisted home sales and two-agent-assisted sales is the price collusion the buyer
agents and the seller agents. They have incentives to collude since they would both
enjoy greater commissions through a higher sale price. The collusion story indicates
another possible source of principal-agent problem and I am not able to fully sep-
arate this effects with other effects. Instead, I test this alternative explanations by
comparing the sales that involve agents from same office with the sales that involves
agents from different offices. If the collusion story were true, I would expect the
agents from the same brokerage office collude more often on sale price. The sale
price would be higher than the sale price of home sales that are assisted by agents
from two offices. On the contrary, I find the home sales that involve two agents from
the same office are sold 0.3% or 600 dollars less, which does not favor the collusion
story.
My empirical findings provide some evidence to a number of theoretical papers
that studies how the commission structure creates misaligned incentives for the home
owners and the agents and how it induces principal-agent problems in housing mar-
ket. For example, Zorn and Larsen [34] build a standard agency model and show that
both flat-fee and percentage commission systems do lead to an alignment of the sellers
and brokers interests and the broker’s amount of search and listing price might also
be below the sellers optimal price. Arnold [2] further compares the fixed-percentage
commission, flat-fee, and consignment systems and concludes that fixed-percentage
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commission system is the only one of the three systems considered that can induce
a first-best, incentive-compatible contract, giving its distortion on pricing. The dis-
cussion of the costs of principal-agent problems is extended to a general framework
in Lazear [18]’s recent paper. In the paper, he investigates the informational benefits
from hiring an agent and the costs of incentive misalignment resulting from com-
mission structures. He finds that when agents have superior information or cheaper
time than owners, the percentage commissions may induce a larger costs from price
distortion than the flat fee commissions. Although the latter system may sacrifices
other motivating aspects of the performance pay. My research adds to this discussion
that the agency structure, when it’s combined with the percentage commissions, may
cause more severe principal-agent problems in real estate market.
My findings also adds to the growing empirical studies on the impact of informa-
tion distortion. The information asymmetry between agents and the home owners
leads to a distortive sale price because it enables the agents to push the home own-
ers to accept a lower price from direct buyers. This information distortion is also
find in some other markets. For example, excess capacity in hospital leads doc-
tors to induce demand for more expensive services from their clients [9]. In vehicle
inspection market, the inspectors tend to let vehicles pass the inspections to earn
repeat business [14]. Particular in real estate markets, a number of recent papers
also find evidence of the information distortion. Rutherford et al. [25] compares the
agent-owned home sales and the client-owned home sales and find that the agents
on MLS of one metropolitan area in Texas do not sell their homes faster than their
client-owned homes, but they do use their information advantage to sell at a price
premium of approximately 4.5%. Levitt and Syverson [19] also find evidence consis-
tent to Rutherford et al. [25]’s findings. They examine nearly 100,000 home sales on
MLS Illinois and find that the agents are more impatient in home sales and is willing
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to accept lower prices for a shorter sale time. Their work shows that the homes owned
by real estate agents sell for 3.7% more than other homes and stay on the market
9.5 days longer. Two recent papers that study the dual agency structure are more
related to my study. Prince et al. [24] examine the effects of the regulation of dual
agency in residential real estate transactions in Long Island, New York between 2004
and 2007 but do not find any effect on sale price. Johnson et al. [15] find that the
impact of dual agency depends on property ownership. They conclude that the dual
agent is associated with a 7.19 percent price premium on agent owned properties,
a 13.06 percent price discount on government-owned properties and a 7.04 percent
discount on bank owned properties. While the price differences are quite economic
significant among three types of homes, the results should be interpreted with cau-
tious. Although the neighborhood fix effects are controlled in their analysis, if the
ownership sorts on unobserved home characteristics such as home quality, the differ-
ence in sale price may not reflect the differential effects of dual agency. In contrast
to their findings, I find the dual agency structure do have a negative effect on the
sale price, although it does not affect sale speed. It supports that the information
distortion not only presents in the way that agents spend less efforts on selling their
clints homes than their own homes, but also in the circumstance when they sell the
houses to direct buyers at lower price.
My findings together with these studies in information distortion also fit into the
context of studying the efficiency (or inefficiency) of the brokerage service. Hsieh
and Moretti [13]’s paper argues that the real estate brokerage is generally inefficient
in terms of sale price and sale speed. They present across-city evidence that entry of
new real estate brokers could further drive down the agent’s returns and incentives
and aggravate the inefficiency. Hendel et al. [11] instead compares the home sales
on MLS and home sales on a For-Sale-By-Owner platform and find that although
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MLS provide full brokerage services and homes are sold faster, the MLS listings
do not generate a higher sale price. But their findings are less reliable to draw
conclusions on inefficiency of the MLS service if the sellers on two platforms are
different. Bernheim and Meer [3] also compare for-sale-by-owner (FSBO) homes
with agent-assisted homes on the Stanford University campus. They find that the
add value of brokerage service bundle in this non-MLS market do not justify the
commissions. Their findings should also be interpreted and generalized to other real
estate market with cautious if the Stanford housing market differs substantially from
traditional MLS markets.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide a simple
model to illustrate the misalignment between home owner’s incentive and agent’s
incentive. I show that agents are willing to accept offers from direct buyers than from
buyer’s agents, even if the prices are lower. But the speed of sale does not depend
on agency structure. In section 3, I introduce the sample set from Dallas Multiple
Listing Service (MLS) database and provide summary statistics. In section 4, I
present empirical evidence on the principal-agent problem and check the sensitivity
of our results. The last section is the conclusion.
3.2 A Simple Model
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model to illustrate the mechanism
of agency structure (commission structure) on home sales. The basic idea is that
a profit maximization seller’s agent will set lower reservation price to a buyer and
higher reservation price to a buyer’s agent. Therefore, the seller agent is more willing
to accept offers from direct buyers than from other agents that delegate buyers.
But since the probabilities of getting a direct buyer and getting a buyer’s agent is
determined by market conditions rather than home listing information, the speed of
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sale should not be depending on the agency structure.
Consider the decision making process of a home seller agent. The objective
function for the agent is to maximize the commissions, which comes as a percentage
of the home sale price. In each period, the agent draws a pair (θ, p) of visitor type and
a home buying offer. The type of visitor θ can be either a buyer’s agent or a buyer
along. In the former case, if the agent accepts the offer, he gets a percentage α of
sale price. In the latter case, the agent gets 2α. I assume the probabilities are q and
1− q respectively. The house buying offer p is drawing from some distribution with
c.d.f. F (p). The agent can either accept an offer or decline and offer. Furthermore,
the draws of θ and p are simultaneous and independent. The agent can draw a new
offer if and only if he also draws a new visitor type.
A seller’s agent chooses visitor type-offer v(θ, p) pairs subject to the following
conditions. First, if the home is sold to visitor with type θ and offer p, the agent gets
a total amount θp of commission and the sale ends. Therefore the worker maximizes
E
∑∞
t=0 1[st = sold] ∗ θtpt. Second, the visitor type takes binary outcomes. If the
visitor is a buyer’s agent, θ = α and θ = 2α if the visitor is a buyer. Third, an
offer is a draw of p from c.d.f. F. Successive draws are independent with F (0) = 0
and F (B) = 1, where B is some upper bound. The agent decides at each period
whether to accept a type-offer pair or decline the offer. If the offer is declined, the
agent draws a new pair at the beginning of next period.
Let v(θ, p) be the optimal value of the problem at the beginning of a period for
a agent with visitor type-offer pair (θ, p) who is about to decide whether to draw a
new visitor type and buying offer. The Bellman equation is
v(θ, p) = max
{
θp;−c+ β
∫ ∫
θ′p′dF (p′)G(θ′)
}
(3.1)
35
where G(θ = α) = p and G(θ = 2α) = 1 − p. β is the time discount factor and
c is the waiting cost. The maximization is over the above two choices, i.e., either
accepting θp or draw a new pair (θ′, p′) in next period. The agent’s optimal strategy
is to set a reservation price p¯ depending on the type of visitor, such that
v(θ, p) =
 θp¯ = −c+ β
∫ ∫
θ′p′dF (p′)G(θ′) : p ≤ p¯
θp : p > p¯
(3.2)
and accept offer only when it exceeds the reservation price. I denote p¯(θ = α) = p¯1
be the reservation price conditioned on receiving offer from a buyer’s agent and
p¯(θ = 2α) = p¯2 be the reservation price conditioned on receiving offer directly from
a buyer. The reservation prices are determined by the following equations,
αp¯1 = −c+ (2− q)αβ
∫ B
0
pdF (p) (3.3)
2αp¯2 = −c+ (2− q)αβ
∫ B
0
pdF (p) (3.4)
After some algebra, we find that p¯1 and p¯2 satisfy conditions
p¯1 = −c/αγ1 + (2− q)β/γ1
∫ B
p¯1
(p− p¯1)dF (p) (3.5)
and
p¯2 = −c/αγ2 + (2− q)β/γ2
∫ B
p¯2
(p− p¯2)dF (p), (3.6)
where γ1 = 1− (2− q)β and γ2 = 2− (2− q)β or γ2 = γ1 + 1. Therefore, the agent’s
optimal choice is to accept offer from a buyer’s agent only if the offer exceeds p1 and
accept offer from buyer if buyer’s offer exceeds p2. Noticce that α is usually equal or
less than 3%. We have the following propositions.
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Proposition 3.2.1 Given c.d.f F , q ∈ [0, 1] and α ∈ (0, 0.1), we have p¯1 > p¯2
and E(p|buyer′sagent) > E(p|buyer). Furthermore, as q decreases, both p¯1 and p¯2
decrease and p¯2 decreases more.
This proposition says that the seller agent will set lower reservation price to a buyer
than the reservation price to a buyer’s agent to maximize his profit. It predicts that
holding other things constant, the sale prices of one-agent-assisted homes will be on
average smaller than the sales that involve both a seller’s agent and a buyer agent.
It also suggests that the arrival rate of house visitors can affect the reservation prices
and in hotter market, the difference in sale price between one-agent-assisted homes
and two-agent-assisted homes is smaller.
Since in each period, the seller agent receives an independent draw of the agency
structure and offer. I denote the probability of sale in each period as Prob(sale) and
Prob(sale) = q(1− F (p¯1)) + (1− q)(1− F (p¯2)). (3.7)
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2.2 Define T as time on the market, we have E(T ) = 1/Prob(sale)
and E(T |θT = 2α) = E(T |θT = α) = E(T ).
The speed of sale, or the time on the market is the reciprocal of the probability
of sale. Since the probabilities of getting a direct buyer and getting a buyer agent is
determined by market conditions rather than home listing or seller’s agent’s reserva-
tion price, the speed of sale would not be different, whether the home is sold directly
to a buyer, or sold through a buyer agent.
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3.3 The Data and Variables
3.3.1 The Dallas Multiple Listing Service
The data set I use comes from Dallas multiple listing service(MLS) database.
The multiple listing service is an actively managed home listing platform that en-
ables real estate brokers share information on properties they have listed and invite
other brokers to cooperate in their sale in exchange for compensation if they produce
the buyer. MLS is the primary source of information of homes currently for sale.
According to NAR’s 2006 survey of home buyers and sellers, 88 percent of sellers
reported that their home was listed in the MLS. The MLS disseminates listing infor-
mation and sellers benefit by increased exposure to their property and buyers benefit
because they can obtain information about all MLS-listed properties while working
with only one broker.3[31]. In current, about 90 percent of residential properties are
listed and sold through over 800 MLSs nationwide.
The Dallas multiple listing service database focuses on the Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington metropolitan area and its vicinity and records the listing information and
transaction details of every residential property that is listed on Dallas MLS. A
typical house listing record in Dallas MLS contains information on the type of house,
house address, list date, off-market date, listing price, final sale price and a selection
of house characteristics including home size, lot size, number of bedrooms, number of
bathroom, etc.. I get the MLS data on 88,788 home sales in 2007. The S&P/Case-
Shiller home price index shows that the residential real estate in Dallas market
between this period is relatively stable4.[30]
3see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple listing service for detail functions of multiple listing
service.
4The S&P/Case-Shiller Dallas home price index measures the average change in value of existing
single-family housing stock in Dallas given a constant level of quality. During 2007, the index
changes moderately from 122.64 in January to 120.78 in December. The peak value is 126.47 in
June and trough is 120.78 in December.
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The novelty of this data set is that it includes the agents information that can
help me identify the one-agent-assisted home sales and two-agent-assisted home sales.
Foe each home sale, both the seller agent ID and buyer agent ID are attached. This
ID is unique for real estate agent. If the ID on the seller agent is the same as the
buyer agent, the home is sold to a direct buyer. If the IDs are different, the home
sale would have involved two agents. Moreover, both the seller’s brokerage office
ID and buyer’s brokerage office ID are also recorded in each sale and I can test the
collusion between agents.
3.3.2 The Data and Variables Summary
In the sample set, about 96% of the properties are single-family residential houses
and the rest 4% are condominiums. We focus on residential single-family home sales
in our analysis. The condominiums are excluded from our analysis because the
condominium market may behave quite different from the major residential market.
The outcome variables in our analysis are the home list price, sale price and time
on the market (TOM). The house list price and sale price are directly observed from
the data, and the time on the market is measured number of the weeks between the
house off-market date and the list date. We make the following restrictions to the
estimation sample. First, we drop sales with list prices and sale price that are below
the 1st and above 99th percentiles respectively. Second, we dropped sales with sale
price to list price ratio that is less than 0.5 or greater than 2 to exclude suspicious
recordings. Third, we drop sales where the time on the market is greater than 2 years.
Those sales account less than 0.1% of the total sample size. In total, we reduce the
sample size to 84,348 home sales. On average, the home list price is around 200,000
dollars and the final sale price has 6% discount. A typical home stays on the market
for 79 days and 99% of the homes are sold within a year. The summary statistics of
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house list price, sale price and time on the market (TOM) is presented in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Home Sales and Home Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
List price (dollars) 199826 140503 84348
Final sale price (dollars) 188826 133247 84348
Price change (dollars) 11000 17652 84348
Sale to List price ratio 94% 8% 84348
Time on the market (days) 79 76 84348
Number of bedrooms 3.4 0.71 84313
Number of bathrooms 2.5 0.87 84279
Home size (sqft) 2285 960 8799
Imputed Home size (sqft) 2205 810 84266
Lot size (sqft) 10266 7690 31946
The variable of main interest is the agency structures of the home sales. During
the year of 2007, in total 12,721 seller agent actively practiced in home sales. Among
the homes, 85% are bought and sold with the assistance of buyer agents and seller
agents, while the rest 15% are assisted by dual agents. From the agent’s perspective,
on average the seller agent assisted 118 of home sales. But this number is driven
up by some star agents and the median agents sold 16 homes per year. Among the
agents who sold more than one homes in 2007, 82% of them have both dual-agent-
assisted sale and two-agent-assisted sale records. The median agent has 11% of the
former sales and 89% of the latter. There is a substantial variation across agents and
the standard deviation is 17%. The summary statistics of the agents performance
can be found in table 3.2.
In analysis, we use a binary variable to indicate whether a home sale is assisted
with only a seller agent or both seller agent and buyer agent. To be specific, we
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Agent Sales
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Number of home sales 118 287 84348
Homes sold by dual agents(%) 15% 18% 84348
Agent average dual agencies 18 54 84348
Agents involved in both agency structure (%) 82% 39% 84348
Homes sold by agents from the same office (%) 5% 23% 84348
define
dual agency dummy ij =
 1 : if home sale is assited by dual agent0 : if home sale is assisted by two different agents
(3.8)
where ij denotes agent i and j denotes house listing j. We also define another a
dummy variable to indicate whether a home sale is assisted by two agents from the
same brokerage office or from different brokers as follows.
same office dummy ij =
 1 : if home sale assisted by two agents in same office0 : if home sale assisted by agents in different brokers
(3.9)
Of the 84,348 total home sales, 4,963 sales are assisted by two agents from the same
brokerage office and 68,044 sales are assisted by by agents from different brokers.
Besides the key variables, the data set also provides us information on the house
characteristics, including the number of bedrooms and number of bathrooms. How-
ever, the home size is available for about one third of the houses. We use regression-
based method to approximate home square footage for houses that have missing
data.5 The house lot size is sometimes directly recorded in square footage and some-
5We first regress house square footage on number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, house lot
size (if available) and 5-digit zip code dummies. Then we use the estimated coefficients to predict
the square footage for missing values.
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times include the lengths of all sidelines of the lot. We carefully derive approximated
lot size using imputation method.6 The average home size in our sample set is about
2200 square feet with 3.4 bedrooms and 2.5 bathrooms, and the lot size is about
10000 square feet. The summary statistics of house characteristics are also presented
in table 3.1.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Identification Strategy
My identification strategy is to compare the outcomes of home sales in the dual
agency situation with that of home sales that involve two different agents. If the
principal-agent problem exists, I would expect the dual-agent-assisted home sales
have lower sale price or deeper discounts than do the two-agent-assisted home sales.
A general econometric model that describes the relation between dual agency and
sale price is as follows.
ln(sale price)ij = f(dual agency dummy ij;Xj, zj, ci) + uij (3.10)
In above model, the subscript i refers to agent i and j refers to house listing
j. The dependent variable is the log of sale price. The dual agency dummy is the
dummy variable defined earlier that equals to one if only the seller’s agent assisted
the home sale and 0 otherwise. Xj is a set of observed house characteristics and zj is
unobserved house information. The information on seller’s agent is also unobserved
and denotes as ci. uij is the stochastic term.
Our identifying assumption is that conditional on the agent fixed effects, the
6The size of housing lot is recorded in side lengths for some houses. If the lot is in rectangular
shape, the lot size is directed calculated as the product of two adjacent sides. If the lot is non-
rectangle, the lot size cannot be exactly computed without at least one known angle. We therefore
approximate the lot size by taking average of two opposite sides and multiply the two averages.
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agency structure for each home sale is assigned randomly. This assumption relies on
three facts. First, the agent’s ability is heterogenous and it affects home sales. Some
agents are more knowledgable and more famous while some are less experienced. Star
agents may be able to generate more home sales without cooperation of other agents
and at the same time, they also sell homes more effectively. Failing in capturing the
agent heterogeneity could result in a spurious relation between agency structure and
sale price. Therefore in the main regressions, I control the unobserved agent level
information through the agent fixed effects.
The second fact is that at the time when the each home were listed, neither the
home owner nor the seller agent could perfectly predict whether the home is going
to be sold to a direct buyer or to a buyer with an agent. Although some seller agents
may have better chance to be served as dual agent than other agents, the possibility
of dual agency for each agent is still random. Therefore, the seller agents would
apply similar pricing and marketing strategy to all the listing homes. A number of
papers have found that seller agents strategic set the list price to attract buyers,
for example, see Yavas and Yang [32], Haurin et al. [10] and Zhao [33]. And if the
agency structure is random, it should not affect the list price determination.
In table 3.3, I specify a log-linear regression model and test the relation between
list price and agency structure. The first column is a pooled regression that regress
the list price on dual agency dummy and observed home characteristics. The coeffi-
cient on the dual agency dummy is 0.06%, indicating that it has a negligible impact
on list price, and it is insignificant. The home size and number of bathrooms are
positively correlated to the list price. The number of bedrooms are negatively corre-
lated with list price because more luxury homes tend to have fewer bedrooms given
the home size. In the second column and third column, we add month fixed effects
and agent fixed effects to control time-varying market conditions and agent charac-
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teristics that may affect the agency structure and list price. In the last column, we
also include the home lot size and a dummy for irregular lot. The sample size is
reduced to 32,143. In all these model specifications, the coefficients on dual agency
dummy are insignificant.
Table 3.3: Log List Price and Agency Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(LP) ln(LP) ln(LP) ln(LP)
Dual agency dummy 0.060% 0.11% -0.46% -1.51%
(0.06) (0.10) (-0.95) (-1.92)
Number of bedrooms -0.0189∗∗ -0.0186∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗
(-3.12) (-3.06) (5.36) (3.66)
Number of bathrooms 0.355∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(39.44) (39.27) (35.87) (25.05)
Log home size 0.354∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(17.53) (17.43) (18.89) (8.95)
Log lot size 0.132∗∗∗
(18.34)
Irregular lot dummy 0.0828∗∗∗
(7.44)
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Agent fixed effects No No Yes Yes
(-0.32) (-0.26) (-0.58)
Constant 8.499∗∗∗ 8.480∗∗∗ 7.980∗∗∗ 8.612∗∗∗
(67.58) (67.48) (20.90) (14.03)
N 84244 84244 84244 32143
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
t Note: LP refers to list price
The third fact that justifies our identification assumption is that I do not find any
sorting issue on home observed characteristics. In my regression model, if the unob-
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served home characteristics is correlated with the agency structure, my identification
strategy could be threatened and the results are less valid. For example, if homes
with lower quality that are often on discounts attract more direct buyers than other
homes do, the difference in sale price may be explained by the difference in home
value rather than the agency structure. Given the data limitation, I would not be
able to completely ruled out the sorting possibility un home unobservables. Instead,
I test the correlation between agency structure and home observed characteristics.
Table 3.4: Probit Model of Agency Structure and Home Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dual agent Dual agent Dual agent Dual agent
Number of bedrooms -0.0155 -0.0159 0.0310 0.0307
(-1.22) (-1.25) (1.53) (1.52)
Number of bathrooms 0.187∗ 0.186∗ 0.214 0.211
(1.71) (1.70) (0.78) (0.77)
Log home size (log sqft) -0.614 -0.610 -0.676 -0.667
(-1.35) (-1.33) (-0.96) (-0.94)
Log lot size 0.161∗∗ 0.161∗∗
(2.84) (2.83)
Irregular lot dummy -0.0133 -0.0151
(-0.36) (-0.41)
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Constant 3.159∗∗∗ 3.173∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗ 1.950∗∗∗
(10.95) (11.01) (4.08) (4.13)
N 84244 84244 32143 32143
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.4 presents the estimation results from a probit model. In the first col-
umn, only the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms and log home size are
included in the regression and only the number of bathrooms has marginally sig-
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nificant positive correlation on the agency structure. If the number of bathroom is
positively correlated with home luxury, it may indicate a marginally sorting issue.
In the second column, we add month fixed effects and the results are similar to the
first column. In the third and fourth column, we add home lot information, the
coefficient on number of bathroom becomes insignificant. Instead, the coefficient on
lot size becomes significant. It still provides a scenario that there might be a mild
sorting on home characteristics. Although the agency structure does not sort on a
number of other home characteristics, the results should be interested with cautious.
3.4.2 The Home Sale Price
The economic model predicts that the sale agents are more likely to accept offers
from direct buyers even if the offers are lower because they enjoy higher commissions
in dual agency case. It sheds light on the relation between home sale price and the
commission rate. Ideally, if I were able to see the commission rate in each transaction,
I would directly test how the relation between changes in commission rate and the
home sale price. Instead, I focus on the effect of agency structure on home sale price
and specify a log-linear regression model as follows.
ln(sale price)ij = β0 + dual agency dummy ijβ1 +Xjγ + ci + uij (3.11)
As explained before, we control the agent fixed effects ci and home observed char-
acteristics in our analysis. The estimation results are reported in table 3.5. All
standard deviations are clustered at the agent level. Overall, I find a strong evidence
that support the existence of the principal-agent problem in the dual agency home
sales. In the first column, I regress the log sale price against dual agency dummy
without controlling other variables. The coefficient on the dual agency dummy is
-6.3% and it is significant at 1% level. It suggests that the homes are sold at -6.3%
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lower in dual agency case, a strong evidence that the seller agents leverage the infor-
mation advantage to distort the sale price and earn more commissions. In column
2, home characteristics and agent fixed effects are added into the regression model.
The coefficient on the dual agency dummy dropped to about -1.7%. The large drop
in the magnitude may be mainly attributed to the inclusion of agent fixed effects,
since the marketing or discount strategy may vary substantially across the seller
agents. In column 3 of table 5, the month fixed effects are also controlled and the
dual-agent-assisted home sales are still associated with about 1.6% more discounts
than the two-agent-assisted home sales. With the inclusion of log home lot size and
dummy for irregular lot, the sample size is reduced more than a half, but the effect
of agency structure on sale price becomes -2.6%. The results also imply that with
the assistance of an additional buyer agent, the home buyers do not benefit from
buyer agent services. Instead, they pay about 1.7% to 2.6% more on the final price.
Some other home attributes are all positively significant in the regressions, includ-
ing the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, the log of home size, the log
of lot size and irregular lot dummy. Larger homes are unsurprisingly sold at higher
price. On average, a 10% increase in home size leads to roughly 2.6-3.5% increase
the home sale price. Homes that have larger yard also tends to be more popular. A
10% increase in home lot size leads to about 1.3% increase in the home sale price.
Besides home size and lot size, the bedrooms and bathrooms also add value to the
home sales. An additional bedroom adds about 2.5% value to the home sales. The
coefficient on number of bathroom is surprisingly 0.24, about ten times the size of
coefficient on bedroom and suggests that each additional bathroom will bring 24%
increase in home sale price. One possible explanation is that luxury homes usually
have more bathrooms and when it is unobserved, the coefficient on the number of
bathrooms picks up the unobserved effects.
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Table 3.5: Log Sale Price and Agency Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(SP) ln(SP) ln(SP) ln(SP)
Dual agency dummy -6.28%∗∗ -1.72%∗∗∗ -1.63%∗∗∗ -2.62%∗∗
(-3.11) (-3.51) (-3.33) (-3.25)
Number of bedrooms 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗
(4.99) (5.05) (3.01)
Number of bathrooms 0.240∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(33.93) (33.90) (22.62)
Log home size (log sqft) 0.352∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(20.81) (20.62) (10.07)
Log lot size 0.125∗∗∗
(18.18)
Irregular lot dummy 0.0813∗∗∗
(7.10)
Month fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Agent fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11.97∗∗∗ 7.468∗∗∗ 7.438∗∗∗ 8.043∗∗∗
(684.76) (18.88) (18.91) (12.24)
N 84348 84244 84244 32143
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
t Note: SP refers to sale price
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Although the information asymmetry allows the seller agents to persuade the
home owners to lower the sell price when they serve as dual agents, their capability of
leveraging the information advantage may be affected by competition among buyers.
For example, more competition may reveal the market information to the home
owners and reduce the seller agent’s power to push the home owners accepting low
price. I separate the home sales into two groups. In one group, the sale price of homes
is bid above the list price, which implies those homes attract more competition among
home buyers. In another group, the home sales are associated with less competition
among buyers and the sale price is below the list price. I test the effect of the agency
structure for each group in table 3.6.
The first two columns of table 3.6 report the estimates of homes that are sold at
sale price less than the list price. In the first column, the coefficient on dual agency
dummy is 2.6% and it is significant at 1% level, suggesting that the seller agents can
better exert the information advantage and give 2.6% more discounts to direct buyers
and enjoy double commission benefits from dual agency. In the second column when
the home lot size information is added into the regression, the discounts become even
deeper. In the column 3 and column 4, the same regression models are applied to
the homes that attract more competition among buyers and are sold above list price.
The coefficient on dual agency structure becomes positive. It may suggest that that
when the information advantage is reduced by competition among buyers, the seller
agents in dual agency case tend to persuade the buyer to offer a higher price. But
the effect is statistically insignificant.
An alternative explanation to our results that the two-agent-assisted homes are
sold at a higher price than dual-agent-assisted homes is that the real estate agents
collude on home sale price. In fact, both agents have incentives to agree on a higher
sale price since they both benefit from such sale. This explanation provide another
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Table 3.6: Buyer’s Competition, Log Sale price and Agency Structure
SP < LP SP >= LP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dual agency dummy -2.60%∗∗∗ -3.33%∗∗∗ 1.81% 0.09%
(-4.55) (-3.48) (1.60) (0.05)
Number of bedrooms 0.0150∗∗ 0.0104 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0593∗∗∗
(2.78) (1.32) (7.02) (4.92)
Number of bathrooms 0.225∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(30.32) (19.93) (19.48) (13.44)
Log home size (log sqft) 0.417∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.101
(21.77) (10.07) (3.46) (1.90)
Log lot size 0.126∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(17.76) (7.30)
Irregular lot dummy 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.0948∗∗∗
(5.81) (3.87)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.647∗∗∗ 7.395∗∗∗ 10.11∗∗∗ 10.38∗∗∗
(15.43) (10.13) (19.58) (12.84)
N 64882 24741 19362 7402
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
t Note: SP refers to sale price
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mechanism that may create the principal-agent problem from the buyer’s point of
view. Unfortunately, I am unable to directly identify the collusion sale and non-
collusion sale to test this explanation. However, an possible way to test is to compare
the home sales in which the seller agents and the buyer agents are more likely to
collude with the home sales in which they are less likely to collude. Agents from
same brokerage office are more likely to collude since they are known to each other
and more often cooperate in sales. Therefore I test the collusion story by comparing
the home sales that are assisted by agents from the same brokerage office to the
home sales that are assisted by agents from different brokerage offices. As described
in previous section, a dummy variable same office dummyij is used to capture the
variation of brokerage office and it equals one if agents are from the same office.
The estimation results are summarized in table 3.7. Column 1 and column 3
are the estimation results from the OLS regression. The coefficients on the same
office dummy ranges from -0.2% to 0.5% and both are economically and statistically
insignificant. After including the agent fixed effects, the coefficients on the same
office dummy reported in column 2 and column 4 remain insignificant. It suggests
that the agents from same office may not collude on sale price, at least they do
not behave differently on sale price from the agents from different offices. A less
intuitive results in the regression is that the coefficient on the number of bedrooms is
significantly negative in column 1 and 3 without controlling the agent fixed effects.
In fact, this is caused by the correlation between agent unobserved characteristics
and the home characteristics. In column 2 and 4, after controlling the agent fixed
effects, the effect of the number of bedrooms become positively significant on the
home sale price.
In addition to the above explanation, I also checked the possible relations between
the buyer’s heterogeneity in patience, the agency structure and the sale price, since
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Table 3.7: Home Sales and Collusion in Office
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(SP) ln(SP) ln(SP) ln(SP)
Same office dummy -0.21% -0.66% 0.56% -0.17%
(-0.17) (-1.05) (0.32) (-0.16)
Number of bedrooms -0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ -0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(-3.58) (5.12) (-6.68) (3.31)
Number of bathrooms 0.336∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(34.92) (30.93) (30.16) (20.82)
Log home size (log sqft) 0.405∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(19.25) (20.06) (8.35) (8.75)
Log lot size 0.112∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(8.60) (16.23)
Irregular lot dummy 0.137∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗∗
(7.87) (6.43)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agent fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Constant 8.083∗∗∗ 7.149∗∗∗ 8.089∗∗∗ 7.655∗∗∗
(59.54) (15.90) (29.80) (10.68)
N 72923 72923 27802 27802
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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the positive correlation between dual agency and sale price discount may also be
attribute to the buyer’s patience. For example, if the buyers of more expensive
homes are busier and less patient, they are more likely to delegate the search to the
buyer agents. At the same time, they may accept a higher price and therefore the
price of home sales with the assistance of two agents appear to be higher than home
sales that have dual agents. From the buyer’s point of view, it provides another
channel through which the buyer agents can take more advantage from information
asymmetry and buyer’s impatience and it may lead to more severe principal-agent
problem. In figure 2, use home list price as a proxy for home value and plot the
relation between home value and dual agency percentage. It shows that when homes
are less than 100,000, the dual-agent-assisted home sales take up about 20% of the
total home sales. It suggests that buyers for cheaper homes are more likely to be .
But when the home value is above 100,000, there is no significant relation between
the home value and adopting of dual agency.
3.4.3 The Speed of Home Sale
Since at the time of listing, neither the home owners nor the seller agents know
the agency structure of the home sales and the buyer type only realized when the
homes are sold, the speed of sale should not be correlated with agency structure. I
also test the effect of agency structure on the time on the market in this section. If
there is no correlation between the agency structure and the speed of sale, it adds
more support to the randomness of the agency structure in home sale. I use time
one the market to measure the speed of sale and duration model may particular fit
the data. I specify the Cox proportional hazards model as follows.
λ(t;Wij) = κ(Wij)λ0(t) (3.12)
53
where W = (dual agency dummy ij, Xj, ci, uij).
The estimation results are summarized in table 3.8. All the coefficients on the
dependent variables have been translated from hazard ratio to percentage effects. In
the first column, the dual agency dummy together with the home size, the number
of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms and the month fixed effects are included in
the regression model. Initially the coefficient on dual agency dummy is significant
without controlling the agent fixed effects and the magnitude reduces mildly to about
-9% when I add the log of home lot size and the lot shape in the third column.
Without considering the seller agent information, it suggests that on average, the
dual-agent-assisted homes stay on the market for -11.7% shorter time than two-
agent-assisted homes. Although the coefficient is significant, it may reflect spurious
relation between the agency structure and the time on the market. To test this, I
further control the agent fixed effects and re-estimate the model in column 2. The
result shows that after controlling the agent fixed effects, the coefficient drops to -
0.3% and the effect of dual agency on the sale speed becomes both economically and
statistically insignificant. When I add the home lot size and lot shape dummy into the
regression in column 4, the coefficient on dual agency dummy remains insignificant
and the sign even flips. This exercise implies that the home sale speed varies across
agents, but it does not depend on the agency structure. This finding in general
support our assumption that the agency structure is randomly determined and it
should not affect the time on the market theoretical model.
Besides the agency structure, most of the home characteristics in the sale speed
regressions are significantly correlated with the home time on the market. First,
larger homes spend more time to sell. On average, 10% increase in the home square
footage will prolong the marketing time by about 10 to 19 percent, or 8 to 16 days.
Second, fixing the home size, homes with more bedrooms and more bathrooms are
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Table 3.8: Proportional Hazard Model Estimation of TOM and Agency Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOM TOM TOM TOM
Dual agency dummy -11.7%∗∗∗ -0.40% -9.08%∗∗∗ 2.43%
(-11.46) (-0.32) (-5.50) (1.22)
Number of bedrooms -0.0218∗∗ -0.0140 -0.0658∗∗∗ -0.0562∗∗∗
(-3.01) (-1.73) (-5.59) (-4.25)
Number of bathrooms -0.104∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(-10.83) (-10.76) (-7.40) (-7.26)
Log home size (log sqft) 0.0985∗∗∗ 0.0427 0.190∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(3.88) (1.49) (4.64) (3.04)
Log lot size -0.0705∗∗∗ -0.0274
(-6.42) (-1.87)
Irregular lot dummy 0.0503∗ 0.0116
(2.13) (0.33)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agent fixed effects No Yes No Yes
(1.55)
N 83618 83618 31908 31908
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: the coefficients have been translated from hazard ratio to percentage.
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more favored in the market and are sold faster. The effect of each additional bedroom
on the time on the market ranges from 2 to 6 percent or 1 to 4 days depending on
model specifications. And each additional bedroom reduces the time on the market
by about 10% to 13% or 8 to 10 days.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I test the effects of agency structure on home sales. I first build
a search model for the seller agent and shows that when agents are delegated pricing
authority, they tends to accept lower offers from direct buyers than offers from buyers
who have other assisting agents and they enjoy all commissions from dual agency
home sales. From the buyer’s point of view, they do not benefit from assistance of
buyer agents neither.
I have employed a unique data set that contains the home information, sale infor-
mation and agents information from Dallas-Fort Worth Metropolitan MLS listings to
empirically examine the effect of agency structure on home sales. I find supporting
evidence from the null effect of agency structure on list price that at the time when
homes were listed, the agency structure was not known to the agents. Conditioning
on the agent fixed effects, whether an agent serves as dual agent in a home sale do
not depend on home observed characteristics. By comparing the homes sales that are
assisted by dual agents to the home sales that are assisted by two different agents,
I find that the dual-agent-assisted home sales are associated with 1.7% to 2.6% or
equivalently 3,400 to 5,000 dollars deeper discounts on the sale price than that of the
home sales which involve two agents. This finding supports the existence of a severe
principal-agent problem.
I also find empirical evidence that the agent’s ability to leverage the information
advantage depends on the competition among buyers. When there are fewer compe-
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titions and when the homes are sold below the list price, the seller agents can give
2.6% to 3.3% more discounts to direct buyers. In contrast, when there are more bid-
ding among buyers when the homes are bid above the list price, the agents can not
exert their information advantage on setting different sale price for different types of
buyer. I have also tested the collusion between buyer agents and seller agents that
could possibly drive the sale price high in the home sales that are associated with
two agents and I find no evidence that favors this story.
The effect of agency structure on the time on the market is also tested in this
paper using a Cox-proportional hazard model and consistent with the theoretical im-
plication, I do not find any correlation between the time on the market and agency
structure after controlling the agent fixed effects. It further supports my identifica-
tion assumption that the agency structure is randomly decided. In addition, home
characteristics and seller agents matter to the sale speed.
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4. PRICE ENDINGS AND HOME SALES
4.1 Introduction
Recent literature in behavioral economics and marketing science suggests that
when sellers decide the list price of some goods, the price endings may not be trivially
decided since it may have some psychological impacts on buyer’s purchasing decision.
In this chapter, I attempt to study how price endings lead to difference in sale
outcomes in real estate markets.
The literature in studying the ending digit effects on sales has suggested several
explanations. First, the price ending affects the buyer’s cognitive ability and it
affects the magnitude judgement. For example, it may take longer time for buyers to
process the magnitude information when the price is precise than when it is round.
For example, buyers may spend longer time to compare 241,873 with 241,349 than
to compare 240,000 with 250,000. Second, some precise prices may be perceived
cheaper than the actual price, especially when prices end with 9. For example,
the perceived difference between $2.99 and $3.00 may be more than one cent. A
number of empirical papers have found that sellers in the retail market strategically
choose the price endings and take advantages of the phycological impacts on buyer’s
decisions. Some of the representative discussions can be found at Schindler and Kirby
[26], Stiving and Winer [27], Mazumdar and Papatla [21], Thomas and Morwitz [28],
Manning and Sprott [20], Thomas et al. [29], etc.
The behavioral effects of price endings on home sales in real estate markets for
several reasons. First, the homes are large items and the buyers may spend more
effort on interpreting the price information and comparing other properties. It is not
clear whether the price ending effect in small item retail markets would exist in the
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housing market. Second, unlike in the retail market that the list price is usually a
take-it-or-leave-it offer, the home list price may be
A number of papers attempt to explore how the home list price is determined and
how it affects home sales. Knight [16] and Haurin et al. [10] consider a sequential
search problem for a typical home seller. In each period, the home seller attracts
a visiting buyer with some probability. The lower the list price, the higher the
probability that it attracts a buyer. On the other hand, the list price is the ceiling
price of buyer’s counteroffer and lower list price reduces the seller’s expected revenue.
The optimal list price then balances these two effects. In the second chapter, I also
provided an explanation to the list price in the directed search model framework.
This chapter deviates from the rational agent models and investigate how some prices
may potentially generate psychological effects and how sellers may take advantages
of these list pricing strategies in home sales. It also help us to interpret the heaping
phenomenon of the list prices (say, 200,000 and 199,000) in real estate markets.
The regression discontinuity analysis and fixed-effect panel data model analysis of
the Dallas multi-year housing market transactions present two main findings. First,
consistent with the precise-price effects in retail markets, when the homes that are
priced as precise price lower than the round price, or in particularly 9-ending prices,
they tend to have fewer discounts and are sold at higher prices than homes that are
priced in thousand-ending. It suggests that the precise price may help the seller with
the negotiation process and the home sale. Second, if the sellers set the price higher
than round prices (thousand-endings), the precise price strategy does not provide
additional benefit in sale prices.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I introduce
the sample set from Dallas Multiple Listing Service (MLS) database and provide
summary statistics. In section 3, I present empirical evidences on of the price ending
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effects on sale prices from the regression discontinuity results and panel data model
estimations. The last section is the conclusion.
4.2 The Data and Variables
The data set I use comes from Dallas multiple listing service(MLS) database. The
multiple listing service is an actively managed home listing platform that enables
real estate brokers share information on properties they have listed and invite other
brokers to cooperate in their sale in exchange for compensation if they produce the
buyer. MLS is the primary source of information of homes currently for sale. In
current, about 90 percent of residential properties are listed and sold through over
800 MLSs nationwide and this data set represents the majority of home sales in the
Dallas metropolitan area. A typical listing record in my data set contains information
on the type of house, house address, list date, off-market date, listing price, final sale
price and a selection of house characteristics including home size, lot size, number of
bedrooms, number of bathroom, etc.. A majority of the homes are either listed with
round price, or listed with 900 as ending. There is substantial amount of homes that
are listed using other ending digits than these two (figure C.1). I separate the data
into two groups, the homes that are listed using round price and the homes that are
listed using precise price and provide the summary statistics in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics by Price Ending
Price ending List price Sale price TOM Bedrm Bathrm SQFT
Round price 248246 234683 71.69 3.42 2.28 2305
(312834) (288287) (67.88) (.72) (.80) (1164)
Precise price 180080 172412 73.47 3.45 2.19 2168
(108819) (103234) (66.18) (.67) (.62) (809)
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From above table, it is quite obvious that the homes that are listed using precise
price are generally cheaper than homes that are listed with round price, indicating
that the sellers may strategically set the price ending digit depending on home char-
acteristics. Therefore a direct comparison of the final sale prices may not reflect a
causal relation between price ending and sale price. I will discuss more about the
identification strategies in the next section.
Sale frequency Count Percentage
1 263796 85.87
2 40930 13.32
3 2406 0.78
4 76 0.02
Total 307208 100.00
Table 4.2 reports the home sale frequencies in the data set. This data set spans
from 2002 to 2008 and in total contains over 30 thousands home transaction records.
About 87% of the homes are sold once during this period. For the rest 13% of
the homes, we observe multiple transactions. These repeated sales provide a unique
advantage that it enables us to specify a panel data model and control the unobserved
home characteristics in analysis. I also presents the summary of home prices and
characteristics in table ??. It shows that the homes that are sold multiple times
have similar list price, sale price and characteristics to the homes that are sold once
during this period. The results from later panel data analysis may be valid for the
whole sample.
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Sale freq. List price Sale price TOM Bedrm Bathrm SQFT
1 200255 190761 74 3.4 2.21 2209
(196666) (182407) (67) (.69) (.68) (945)
2 213946 203785 67 3.45 2.24 2238
(226567) (208199) (62) (.69) (.70) (914)
3 236732 225637 64 3.47 2.28 2278
(337933) (322257) (59) (.71) (.77) (995)
4 184176 174651 83 3.41 1.98 2073
(144377) (139339) (71) (.62) (.64) (868)
Total 202360 192766) 72 3.44 2.22 2213
(202438) (187594) (67) (.69) (.69) (942)
4.3 Estimation Results
4.3.1 Identification Strategies
Conceptually, my identification strategy is to compare the sale outcomes of homes
that are listed using precise price with the sale outcomes of homes that are listed
using round price. But the direct comparison may suffer from the fact that cheaper
homes tend to be listed at precise prices and I would mistakenly conclude that precise
prices have detrimental effects on home sales.
The relation between precise price strategy and home value is more obvious in
figure C.2 where the percentage of homes that uses precise price is negatively corre-
lated with list price and in figure C.3 where the percentage of homes that uses round
price is negatively correlated with home size (square footage).
I avoid this issue and adopt two alternative approaches. The first approach is the
regression discontinuity method. Instead of comparing the average sale prices of all
precise-priced homes and round-priced homes, I focus on narrower list price ranges
and studies whether the precise-price home sales are different from round-priced home
sales. Through this approach, I mitigated the confounding effects of unobserved
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home value on sale prices. The estimation details and results are discussed in the
next subsection.
The second approach is to take advantage of the multiple sales in my data set
and adopt panel data models in analysis. As I discussed in the data section, about
13% of the homes are sold multiple times in eight years and I am able to control
for home unobserved factors in the panel data models. The source of identification
would then come from the homes that are sold using different pricing strategies over
this sample period.
4.3.2 Regression Discontinuity Results
In figure C.4, I plot the average price discount (defined as list price minus sale
price) along the price ending line. For example, if the list price is 199,600 and the
price discount is 8000 dollars, it will fall into the left part of the graph. If the list
price is 200,100, it will fall into the right part of the graph. And if it is a round
price (end in thousands), i.e., 201,000, it will fall exactly into the middle. The dots
represent the average price discount within each price ending cell and the curves are
quadratic fitted curves. Figure C.5 also presents similar analysis but instead use
price discount percentage.
These two graphs present two findings. First, when the homes that are priced
as precise price lower than the round price, or in particularly 9-ending prices, they
tend to have fewer discounts and are sold at higher prices than homes that are priced
in thousand-ending. It suggests that the precise price may help the seller with the
negotiation process and the home sale. Second, if the sellers set the price higher
than round prices (thousand-endings), the precise price strategy does not provide
additional benefit in sale prices.
In table 4.3.2, I statistically estimated the discontinuity gap of the sale price
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Table 4.2: Log Sale Price and Price Discount
(1) (2)
log sale price Price discount in percentage Observations
Bandwidth=1000 .01067*** -.58%*** 193060
(5.53) (-10.19 )
Bandwidth=800 0.0271*** -0.82%*** 151557
(11.87) (-12.49)
Bandwidth=600 0.0273*** -0.91%*** 146001
(10.20) (-11.75)
Bandwidth=400 0.0255*** -0.95%*** 139329
(7.62) (-9.88)
Bandwidth=200 0.0173*** -1.10%*** 132868
(3.90) (-7.76)
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Average treatment effect, regression adjustment for home characteristics
and percentage price discount using different bandwidths. The results show that
the precise-price homes are on average sold at about 0.6% to 1.1% higher than the
round-priced or above round-priced homes.
In figure C.5 to figure C.10, I estimate the precise-price effects on the price dis-
count percentage at different price levels and in figure C.11 to figure C.15, I estimated
the precise-price effects on the log sale price. The results are consistent to the main
findings and are robust.
4.3.3 Panel Data Model Results
Although the discontinuity approach has provided a direct way of testing the
precise-price effects on home sales, it may still suffer from the unobservable issues.
Even within each price level, homes can still be substantially different in many aspects
and analysis that fails to control for these covariates would be less sound.
As I discussed in the data section and in the identification stately section, I adopt
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the panel data feature to statistically estimate the precise price effects as robustness
checks. I create two dummy variables. The first dummy variable is the precise price
dummy that equals to one if the list price is a precise price and zero otherwise. The
second dummy variable is the lower than round price dummy that equals to one
if the precise price is lower than its corresponding thousand-ending price and zero
otherwise. The regression results are reported in table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Log Sale Price, Price Discount and Price Ending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(SP) ln(SP) ln(SP) Price discount
Precise price -0.0453*** 0.0581*** 0.00342 0.887%
(-39.85) (4.99) (0.10) (0.86)
Precise price× 0.0601*** -1.79%***
Lower than round price (5.14) (-5.01)
bedrooms -0.121***
(-110.57)
bathrooms 0.0990***
(76.71)
Home size (sqft) 0.000518***
(475.30)
Constant 11.07*** 11.98*** 11.98*** 5.05%***
(3719.86) (1566.68) (1567.19) (21.67)
Observations 288096 42798 42798 42798
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The first column the table 4.3 is the results from pooled regression estimation of
log sale price. I find that the precise price is negatively correlated with the sale price
and it is because that the home value are negatively correlated with precise price
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strategy so that the regression picks up such negative relation. In the second and
third column, I estimated a fixed effect panel data model. The coefficient on precise
price become significant positive in the second column, suggesting that once I control
the home value, the precise price have positive effect on the sale price. In the third
column, when I include the interaction term of the precise price and lower than round
price dummies into the regression, the interaction term became significant and the
precise price dummy became insignificant. This result is consistent with my previous
regression discontinuity analysis that the precise price strategy helps with the sale
only when it is lower than the round price, or generally when it is a 9-ending price.
The fourth column uses the price discount as dependent variable and it shows that
the results are still robust.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study how the price ending affect sales in housing market.
Recent literature in behavioral economics and marketing science suggests that the
price endings may have some phycological impacts on buyer’s purchasing decision
and sellers may strategically determine the price endings and help the sales.
I analyze a data set that contains multi-year home transaction in the Dallas
Metropolitan area and find positively significant precise-price effects on home sales.
The regression discontinuity analysis and fixed-effect panel data model analysis of
the Dallas multi-year housing market transactions present two main findings. First,
consistent with the precise-price effects in retail markets, when the homes that are
priced as precise price lower than the round price, or in particularly 9-ending prices,
they tend to have fewer discounts and are sold at higher prices than homes that are
priced in thousand-ending. It suggests that the precise price may help the seller with
the negotiation process and the home sale. Second, if the sellers set the price higher
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than round prices (thousand-endings), the precise price strategy does not provide
additional benefit in sale prices.
Although the precise-price effects are significant and consistent with the findings
in the retail markets in previous behavioral economics and marketing literature,
they should be cautiously interpreted. The list prices in the real estate markets are
different from the list prices in most retail markets that the former is a starting
price for negotiation and the latter is a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We would require
more theoretical and experimental analysis to understand how precise price affects
the negotiation and the home sale.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Proofs
In this appendix, I derive the optimality Conditions of the Directed Search Model.
The seller’s dynamic problem can be described in the following Bellman equation
V (a, b) = max
(a,b)
{−c+ β{
∞∑
k=0
pkF (b)
kV +
∞∑
k=1
pkkaG
(k−1)(a)[1− F (a)]
+
∞∑
k=1
pkkbG
(k−1)(b)[F (a)− F (b)] +
∞∑
k=1
pkk
∫ ω
b
y(1− F (y))g(k−1)(y)dy}}.
(A.1)
In above equation, the seller sets list price a and reservation price b to maximize
the value function. In each period, the house is either sold or unsold. The latter
case happens if no buyer’s visit the seller or one or more buyers visit the seller but
make offers that do not meet seller’s reservation price. If the house is unsold, it
stays on the market for the next period. Under other circumstances, the house is
sold to the highest bidder at a, b or the highest bid according to the game rule
specified earlier. c in the Bellman equation denotes seller’s waiting cost per search
period and β is the time discount factor. pk denote the probability that k buyers
visit the seller in one period, and we assume that it follows poisson distribution, i.e.,
pk = Pr(n = k, λ) =
λke−λ
k!
. Fix the number of bidders k, G(k−1)(x) and g(k−1)(x)
denote the cdf and pdf of the highest value among k − 1 draws. We assume that
the buyers’ valuations are independently generated from some distribution with cdf
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F (x) and pdf f(x). From order statistics, we know that
G(k−1)(x) = F (x)k−1, (A.2)
g(k−1)(x) = (k − 1)F (x)k−2. (A.3)
Therefore the Bellman equation can be simplified as follows.
∞∑
k=0
pkG
(k)
1 (b)V = V e
−λ
∞∑
k=0
(λF (b))k
k!
= V e−λeλF (b); (A.4)
∞∑
k=1
pkkaG
(k−1)(a)[1− F (a)] = a(1− F (a))
∞∑
k=1
λke−λ
k!
kF (a)k−1
= λa(1− F (a))e−λ
∞∑
k=1
(λF (a))k−1
(k − 1)!
= λa(1− F (a))e−λeλF (a);
(A.5)
∞∑
k=1
pkkbG
(k−1)(b)[F (a)− F (b)] = b[F (b)− F (a)]
∞∑
k=1
λke−λ
k!
kF (b)k−1
= λb[F (b)− F (a)]e−λ
∞∑
k=1
(λF (b))k−1
(k − 1)!
= λb[F (b)− F (a)]e−λeλF (b);
(A.6)
and
∞∑
k=2
pkk
∫ ω
b
y(1− F (y))g(k−1)(y)dy
= e−λ
∫ ω
b
y(1− F (y))
∞∑
k=2
λk
k!
k(k − 1)F (k−2)(y)f(y)dy
= λ2e−λ
∫ ω
b
y(1− F (y))
∞∑
k=2
(λF (y))k−2
(k − 2)! f(y)dy
= λ2e−λ
∫ ω
b
y(1− F (y))eλF (y)f(y)dy.
(A.7)
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Replacing expressions (A.4) through (A.7) into the value function (A.1), we get
(b+ c)β−1 = be−λeλF (b) + λae−λeλF (a)[1− F (a)]
+ λbe−λeλF (b)[F (a)− F (b)] + λ2e−λ
∫ ω
b
y[(1− F (y)]eλF (y)f(y)dy.
(A.8)
Furthermore, the first order condition of above equation with respect to a gives us
the optimal list price,
bf(a) + {λaf(a)[1− F (a)] + 1− F (a)− af(a)} eλ[F (a)−F (b)] = 0. (A.9)
Finally, the pair {a, b} that satisfies conditions (A.8) and (A.9) is seller’s optimal list
price and reservation price.
A.2 Figures
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Figure A.1: Kernal Density Estimation of Sale Price
Figure A.2: Kernal Density Estimation of List Price
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Figure A.3: Kernal Density Estimation of Time on the Market
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Figure B.1: Dual Agency and Home List Price
Figure B.2: Price Discounts and Agency Structure
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Figure C.1: Frequency of price endings
Figure C.2: Home list price and precise price
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Figure C.3: Home size and precise price
Figure C.4: Discontinuity in Price Decrease: Heterogeneous precise price effects
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Figure C.5: Discontinuity in Sale-price-list-price ratio: Heterogeneous precise price
effects
Figure C.6: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, $100k
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Figure C.7: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, $150k
Figure C.8: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, $200k
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Figure C.9: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, $250k
Figure C.10: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, $300k
83
Figure C.11: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, ln(sale price) $100k
Figure C.12: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, ln(sale price) $150k
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Figure C.13: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, ln(sale price) $200k
Figure C.14: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, ln(sale price) $250k
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Figure C.15: Discontinuity: Heterogeneous precise price effects, ln(sale price) $300k
86
